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I.

JURISDICTION
Appellants L. Stanley Bell and Eagar, Inc. (collectively "Bell") appeal from the June

II, 2001 final judgment of the Honorable Rodney F. Page of the Second Judicial District
Court of Davis County, State of Utah, awarding Bell $10,500 in attorneys' fees and $269 in
costs. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1996), this appeal was assigned to this Court
which has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).
II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly rule that Bell was not entitled to more than $ 10,500

in attorneys5 fees and $269 in costs? If a trial court finds that an award of attorneys' fees is
appropriate, it has broad discretion to determine what constitutes a reasonable fee. See
Deiavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp.. 1999 UT 355, t 8, 993 P.2d 222. That determination
will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. See id.; Faust v. KAI Tech.. Inc.,
2000 UT 82, Tf 12, 15 P.3d 1266, 1268.
III.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
No constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations are

determinative of this appeal.

IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This action stems from Bell's purchase of J. L. Eagar, Inc. (the "Business") from
appellee James L. Eagar ("Eagar"). Eagar started the Business and, through hard work,
Page -I-

earned an international reputation. Eventually, Eagar sold the Business to Bell and retired.
Eagar also owned the property on which the Business operated (the "Property"). Bell
wanted to lease the Property rather than move the Business. Thus, after the purchase, Bell
took possession of the Property and operated the Business there. A disagreement developed
over whether there was a binding lease and, if so, its terms. Bell sued for declaratory relief,
alleging that the parties had agreed to all material lease terms. Eagar counterclaimed,
asserting that the parties had attempted unsuccessfully to negotiate a mutually-acceptable
lease.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW

Ruling on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted
Bell's motion and denied Eagar's. R. 539-541; 590 at 28-30. In a prior appeal, this Court
affirmed that ruling on October 26, 2001. R. 599. After remittitur, Bell requested
$84,598.98 in attorneys' fees and costs. R. 600-643. The trial court granted Bell's motion
but awarded only $10,500 in attorneys' fees and $269 in costs. R. 819-827. Bell appealed.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

In September of 1996, Eagar contacted Business Resource Center, a business
brokerage company, expressing interest in selling the Business. R. 116 at ^J 5; R. 220 at ^f 4.
Initially, Eagar preferred to sell, rather than lease, the Property. See R. 117 at ^f 8; R. 220 at
f 7. Bell offered to purchase the Business if he could also lease the Property. Eagar agreed,
and after closing, Bell began operating the Business on the Property. See R. 119 at H 20.
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Eagar sent several proposed draft leases to Bell, which Bell rejected. See R. 236 (p. 42);
237-38 (pp. 46-49); R. 239 (pp. 55-56); R. 240-41 (pp. 59-62). The parties could not resolve
their dispute, and this action was commenced. The trial court granted Bell's motion for
partial summary judgment and denied Eagar's. R. 539-41; 590 at 28-30. Bell then filed the
motion for attorneys' fees and costs addressed in this appeal.
V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A.

The party seeking attorneys' fees bears the burden of producing evidence to

support the requested award. Bell did not satisfy this burden. Instead, he submitted two very
short self-serving affidavits from his own attorneys that simply concluded that: (1) they
performed the legal services referenced in a "compilation" of bills (as opposed to original
billing records); (2) the "compilation" accurately reflected the time spent; and (3) the time
spent and the fees charged were reasonable. Bell could not, and therefore did not, produce
any of the documents underlying the "compilation," such as billing and payment records,
because he said he had thrown them away. Under such circumstances, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by reducing the amount requested.
B.

A party seeking attorneys' fees must allocate its fee request, categorizing the

time and fees expended for: (1) successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to
attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there would have been an entitlement to
attorney fees had the claims been successful, and (3) claims for which there is no entitlement
to attorney fees. The trial court, in its discretion, may deny fees altogether for failure to
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allocate.

Bell failed to allocate his requested fees.

Instead, he simply attached a

"compilation" of purportedly all attorneys' bills and requested payment of all the fees. Some
of the fees did not relate to any alleged breach or enforcement action. Other fees related to
a motion which Bell filed and then withdrew. As a result of Bell's failure to allocate, the
required evaluation of Bell's fee request by the trial court was impossible. Consequently, the
trial court properly exercised its discretion and reduced the award.
C.

Bell's attorneys claim to have billed 336.25 hours over four years from 1997

to 2000 at the hourly rate of $250 per hour for that entire four-year period. This was
unreasonable for several reasons.
First, this case raised a straight forward question of contract interpretation and the
applicable law was readily available. Second, the evidence submitted by Eagar proved that
Bell's attorneys deviated from the customary billing practice by charging the same hourly
rate for four years. Third, Bell's requested rate of $250 per hour was between 143% and
127% of the customary hourly rate during the four years in question for attorneys in Salt
Lake City with the apparent experience of Bell's counsel. Fourth, the trial court could not
determine which of Bell's attorneys did what or whether both needlessly duplicated services
because neither the "compilation" nor the affidavits of Bell's lawyers distinguished between
the services each attorney allegedly provided. Fifth, the little "evidence" Bell submitted
proved that his attorneys were inefficient, performed unnecessary work, and worked an
unreasonable number of hours, and that Bell requested fees for matters on which he was not

Page -4-

entitled to any award. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by drastically reducing
Bell's unsubstantiated request.
VI.

ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION: BELL DID NOT
SATISFY THE PREREQUISITES FOR AN AWARD OF THE ATTORNEYS'
FEES REQUESTED.
Bell's request for attorneys' fees was correctly reduced to conform to the only
evidence of fees Bell could supply. It is understandable that Bell could not meet his burden
of proving more; the number of hours ostensibly "billed" and the rates charged by Bell's
lawyers were unreasonable. The trial court was solidly within its discretion in determining
that Bell was not entitled to more than $10,500 in attorneys' fees and $269 in costs. The trial
court's ruling should be affirmed.
A.

BELL DID NOT PRODUCE ADEQUATE CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.

An attorneys' fees award must be based on evidence and supported by findings of
fact. See Foote v. Clarke, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998). The party seeking attorneys' fees
"has the burden of producing evidence to buttress the requested award." Id. When the
moving party does not produce sufficient evidence, a fee award is improper. See id. This
is so because "[w]here the parties' evidentiary submissions in support of a request for
attorney fees are deficient, so will be the court's evaluation of those fees." Id. at 56.
Bell's "evidence" consisted solely of: (1) two very short affidavits from his own
attorneys (each little more than one page); and (2) a "compilation"of the time allegedly
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billed. R. 602-05; 613-43; 843. Bell's terse affidavits concluded that Bell's attorneys
performed the services referenced in the "compilation," that the "compilation" accurately
reflected the time spent, and that the time spent and the fees charged were reasonable. R.
602-05. However, when Eagar sought the underlying documentation, Bell supplied nothing.
Eagar was entitled to review original billing statements, original attorney time records, and
documents evidencing payments by Bell. See Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Wesley F. Sine, dba
Cottonwood Bowling Lanes. 830 P.2d 266, 269 (Utah 1992); Ideal Elec. Sec. Co.. Inc. v.
International Fidelity Ins. Co.. 129 F.3d 143 (D.D.C. 1997). This was necessary to allow
Eagar to "present to the court any legitimate challenges" to the claimed attorneys' fees. Id.
at 152. Bell did not produce any of these documents, and when Eagar moved for their
production, Bell represented that they had been "discarded." R. 834-37; 43-44.
In sum, Bell failed to justify his claim for fees with required evidence, saying that the
important billing and payments records - the only credible evidence - had been simply
thrown away. Under such circumstances, the trial court would be justified in denying Bell's
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motion outright.1 See Foote, 962 P.2d at 55-56. Clearly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by reducing the amount requested.
B.

BELL DID NOT ALLOCATE THE REQUESTED FEES,

In Utah, a party seeking attorneys' fees must allocate its fee request, categorizing the
time and fees expended for: "(1) successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to
attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there would have been an entitlement to
attorney fees had the claims been successful, and (3) claims for which there is no entitlement
to attorney fees." Foote, 962 P.2d at 56 (internal quotation and citations omitted). The
evidence "must distinguish between those fees incurred in connection with successful and
unsuccessful claims . . . or the reviewing court will be precluded from making an
independent determination." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 318 (Utah 1998).
Allocation is critical; the trial court may "deny fees altogether for failure to allocate.'5 Id.
Bell failed to allocate as these authorities and the parties' contract requires. The
controlling contract provision (and thus the trial court's ruling) limited any award to
"reasonable" attorneys' fees and costs incurred by the "nondefaulting party" in an

*As a matter of law, the trial court "[was] not obligated to accept the self-serving
testimony" in Bell's affidavits. See Regional Sales Agency. Inc. v. Reichart 784 P.2d 1210,
1215 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); see also Paul Meuller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Assoc. 657
P.2d 1279,1287-88 (Utah 1982) ("it is not good practice to make an award [of attorney fees]
predicated only upon [the] opinion [of a party's attorney]"). Additionally, Eagar submitted
ample evidence disputing Bell's claim for fees, which is discussed below. Further, the trial
court would not have been obligated to accept the affidavits of Bell's attorneys even if those
affidavits had not been contradicted by Eagar's evidence. Regional Sales Agency, 784 at
1215; Beckstrom v. Beckstrom. 578 P.2d 520, 523-24 (Utah 1978).
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enforcement action filed in response to an alleged breach or "default." R. 821. However,
Bell did not even attempt to allocate the requested fees, as required by Foote, Valcarce and
the plain language of the contract.

Instead, he simply attached an unsubstantiated

"compilation" ostensibly of ah attorneys' bills and requested payment of ail the fees woven
into the "compilation." R. 606-43. This only confirmed the problems warned against in
Foote and Valcarce.
Some of the fees Bell requested related only to Bell's initial purchase of the Business,
not any alleged breach or enforcement action. R. 613-17. Those fees were incurred over one
year before this action was even commenced. See id. Other fees related to Bell's Motion
For Leave to File Amended Complaint, which he withdrew. R. 624-25; 723. Bell could not
recover those fees as a matter of law. See Dejavue Inc., 1999 UT App 355, ^[20, 993 P.2d
at 227. These and other examples established how Bell's failure to allocate made a
meaningful and equitable evaluation of Bell's motion impossible. And it was Bell's burden,
not Eagar's, to allocate the requested fees. See Foote, 962 P.2d at 55-56; Valcarce, 961 P.2d
at 318. By dumping ah of his alleged legal bills on Eagar and the trial court, unallocated,
Bell not only failed to meet his burden, he seemed oblivious to it. As a result, the trial court
could not conduct the requisite independent evaluation. See Dejavue Inc., 1999 UT App 355,
Tf 20, 993 P.2d at 227. Bell's terse motion could have been, and perhaps should have been,
denied altogether. See Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 318. The trial court did not abuse its broad
discretion by simply reducing the award.
Page -8-

C

BELL'S REQUESTED FEES WERE UNREASONABLE.

In considering a motion for attorneys' fees, a trial court "must make an independent
evaluation of the reasonableness of the requested fees in light of parties' evidentiary
submissions." See Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 318 (emphasis added). The factors that must be
considered include: (1) the difficulty of the issues involved; (2) whether the attorneys' billing
rate is consistent with rates customarily charged in the locality for similar services; (3) the
efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case; (4) the amount of legal work that was
actually performed; (5) the amount of legal work that was reasonably necessary; and (6) the
reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case. See Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 316;
Deiavuelnc 1999 UT App 355, Tf 22,993 P.2d at 227; Willev v. Willey. 951 P.2d 226,232
(Utah 1997). In sum, the party seeking fees must "prove and establish the reasonableness
of each dollar, each hour, above zero." David C. v. Leavitt 900 F. Supp. 1547, 1555 (D.
Utah 1995). Bell did not, and cannot, do so.
1.

The Issues Were Simple.

The parties' disagreement was not complex; they simply asked the trial court to
construe the following contract provision: "Lease 5 year. Triple Net. Fix Rate First 24
Month. $2,281 + 3 Net Balance 3 years. Tie to CPI plus 1 5 year option." The issue was
whether that provision was ambiguous and, if so, what it meant. As the trial court observed,
this case raised "a straight forward question of contract interpretation" and "[t]he law
applicable in this case was simple hornbook law, readily available to anyone with basic
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research skills." R. 825-26. This alone implies that Bell's request for nearly $85,000 in fees
was unreasonable. Bell's "compilation" bears this out, as shown below.
2.

The Billing Rates for Bell's Attorneys Were Unreasonable,

Bell's fee "compilation" claims that 336.25 attorney hours were devoted over four
years from 1997 to 2000 and that each of Bell's lawyers conveniently charged $250 per hour
for that entire four-year period. R. 613-643. The evidence indicated that both the hourly rate
allegedly "charged," and the number of hours "worked," were unreasonable.
J. Michael Bailey, a shareholder of and commercial litigator with the Salt Lake City
law firm of Parsons Behle & Latimer, testified by detailed affidavit. See R. 750-52. Mr.
Bailey testified that it is customary for attorneys in Salt Lake City to increase their hourly
billing rates on an annual basis to account for the additional experience and expertise gained
during the previous year, as well as other economic factors.

See id. at f 7. Bell's

"compilation" reflects that his attorneys deviated from this customary billing practice,
charging the same hourly rate throughout all four years. R. 613-643. This alone cast
suspicion on the reasonableness of the unsubstantiated fee request and whether Bell was
really charged or ever paid the unchanging hourly rate claimed. See Valcarce, 961 P.2d at
316;Wilky,951P.2dat232.
Even if Bell had submitted evidence that attorneys of like experience and practice in
Salt Lake City customarily charge the same rate for four years (and he did not), Eagar's
evidence showed that the $250 rate Bell requested was unreasonable. Eagar's evidence
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proved that the rate Bell requested was approximately 143% of the 1997 customary hourly
rate for attorneys with the apparent experience of Bell's counsel,2 which was $175. See R.
751 at % 8. This evidence also showed that the $250 rate Bell sought was approximately
141% of $177.50, the customary rate in 1998. See id. Similarly, this evidence revealed that
$250 per hour is approximately 134% of 1999 customary rate of $187.50. See id. Finally,
that evidence established that $250 per hour is approximately 127% of $196.25, the 2000
customary rate. See id. All this evidence was uncontradicted.
In sum, evidence Eagar's evidence established that the hourly rate Bell wanted Eagar
to pay was unreasonable. Although the trial court could have denied Bell's motion
altogether, it simply reduced the hourly rate to $ 175. R. 826. In light of the evidence before
it, the trial court was well within its discretion in doing so. See Dejavue, 1999 UT 355, ^ 8,
993 P.2d at 222; Faust. 2000 UT 82, If 12, 15 P.3d at 1268.
3-

Bell Did Not Present Evidence Sufficient for the Trial Court
to Determine the Efficiency of His Attorneys,

Neither Bell's "compilation" nor the scant affidavits of his two lawyers distinguished
between the services each attorney allegedly provided. Thus, neither Eagar nor the trial court
could determine which attorney did what or whether both needlessly duplicated their
services. Bell provided insufficient evidence for the trial court to independently evaluate the

2

Two attorneys provided services for Bell; Wesley Argyle and David Black. Mr. Argyle
and Mr. Black both graduated from law school, and were admitted to the bar, in 1980. R.
728. The evidence regarding customary rates submitted by Eagar pertains to attorneys with
the same years of experience. R. 751 at f 8.
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reasonableness of his fee request. Bell's evidentiary deficiencies precluded him from
claiming, much less showing on appeal, that the trial court abused its discretion when it
reduced the amount requested. See Dejavue, 1999 UT 3 5 5 4 8, "

3 P 2 d at 222

; Faust, 2000

UT 8 2 4 1 2 , 15P.3datl268. 3
4.

Bell's Attorneys Were Inefficient and Performed Unnecessary
Work.

What little "evidence" Bell submitted confirmed that his attorneys were inefficient,
performed unnecessary work, and worked an unreasonable number of hours, and that Bell
requested fees for matters on which he was not entitled to any award. Following are just a
few examples:
a.

Bell's attorneys claim they billed 5.5 hours to review an agreement on

January 13,1997, January 14,1997, June 24, 1997 and June 30,1997. R. 613. The
agreement is just over 11 pages. R. 664-75. Thus, Bell's attorneys claim to have
spent about 2 hours reviewing each page.
b.

Bell's attorneys claim they billed 4.75 hours to review a commercial

lease and discuss it with Bell on July 7, 1997, August 27, 1997, September 3, 1997

3

As a matter of law, the trial court would have been within its discretion in simply denying
Bell's motion. See Foote, 962 P.2d at 55.
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and September 5,1997. R. 613-14. The lease was only 2 pages long, with a Vi page
addendum. R. 730-32. Again, Bell's attorneys claim to have spent almost 2 hours
reviewing each page.
c.

Bell's attorneys claim they billed 6.5 hours to review a second

commercial lease, and discuss it with Bell, on October 27, 1997, October 29, 1997,
October 30,1997, and November 6,1997. R. 614. The lease is just over 8 pages. R.
734-43.
d.

The billing entries themselves indicate that the 16.75 hours in charges

discussed in subparagraphs a through c above involved Bell's purchase of the
Business, not any alleged default. R. 613-14. And some of those fees were incurred
over a year before Bell's complaint was even filed. No statute or contract provision
even arguably permits Bell to pass off these fees as a charge to Eagar.
e.

Bell's attorneys claim they billed 7 hours for researching, drafting and

reviewing the complaint (in this simple contract action) on May 11, 1998, May 14,
1998, June 4,1998, June 5, 1998 (2 entries for 1 hour each on this date) and June 10,
1998. R. 616. The complaint consists of 5 pages and asserts one claim; declaratory
relief. R. 1-5.
f.

Bell's attorneys claim they billed Vi hour on July 23,1998. R. 618. The

billing notation is "Filed Complaint. Review with Clerk." Id. No complaint was
filed that day.
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g.

Bell's attorneys claim they billed 3 hours on August 4, 1998 (2 entries

of 2 hours and 1 hour respectively) for drafting 10 simple requests for admissions set
forth in approximately 1 lA pages. R. 618.
h.

Bell's attorneys claim they billed time on November 2,1998, November

4, 1998 and November 5, 1998 to prepare for and attend the deposition of their own
client. R. 621. The fact that there are two separate entries on November 5, 1998
implies that both Mr. Argyle and Mr. Black attended the deposition (at $500 per
hour).

See id.

It was unnecessary duplication for both lawyers to attend.

Additionally, the deposition transcript confirms that it lasted only 3 hours. R. 744-45.
However, the time entries on the dates referenced above total 10.5 hours. R. 621.
i.

Bell's attorneys claim they billed 2 hours on November 13, 1998 to

schedule Eagar's deposition and prepare a notice of deposition.

R. 622. On

December 4, 1998, plaintiffs' attorneys billed another hour for drafting a notice of
deposition and a one-paragraph letter to Eagar's counsel. Id.
j.

Bell's attorneys claim they billed 2 hours on November 16,1998 for a

telephone conference with Steve Gardner. R. 622. This entry is curious for several
reasons. First, the length of the phone conference, 2 hours, is suspect. Second, Mr.
Gardner's name has not been mentioned at any time in this matter.
k.

Bell's attorneys claim they billed 7.25 hours on December 15, 1998,

December 16,1998, December 17,1998, December 18,1998 and December 21,1998
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for researching and drafting a "reply memorandum." R. 623. The only reply
memorandum filed near those dates is Bell's reply memorandum supporting his
motion for summary judgment. R. 340-43. That memorandum is 4 pages long, only
3 Vi of which is argument. See id.
1.

Bell's attorneys claim they billed time on January 5,1999 for preparing

for and attending the deposition of "Stan Bell." Two separate entries on that date
state that the time was billed in connection with Mr. Bell's deposition. R. 624. The
existence of two separate entries indicates that both Mr. Argyle and Mr. Black
attended this deposition. Stan Bell was not deposed on January 5,1999. Mr. Eagar
was deposed then, but it was unnecessary duplication for both lawyers to attend (at
$500 per hour).
m.

Bell's attorneys claim they billed 17 hours on January 7,1999, January

11, 1999, January 12, 1999, January 13, 1999, January 14, 1999, January 15, 1999,
February 24, 1999, February 25,1999, March 15,1999, March 16,1999 and March
17,1999 to prepare a motion to amend Bell's complaint and related memoranda and
pleadings, and to research issues related to that motion. R. 624-25; 628. Bell did not
prevail on that motion; he withdrew it. R. 723.
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n.

Bell's attorneys claim they billed 8 hours on January 6, 1999, January

7, 1999, January 27, 1999, January 28, 1999 and January 29, 1999, for reviewing,
drafting and revising documents identified only as "opposition" and "memorandum."
R. 624-26.
o.

Bell's attorneys claim they billed 4.25 hours on February 1, 1999,

February 2, 1999 and February 3, 1999 for drafting, revising, analyzing and
discussing a Stipulation for Withdrawal of Funds, which is only 2 pages long. R. 626;
576-77.
p.

Bell's attorneys claim they billed 12.5 hours on March 18,1999, March

19,1999,March26,1999, April 12,1999 and April 13,1999 to prepare for and attend
the April 13, 1999 hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment. R. 628-30.
Two separate entries on March 18, 1999 and April 12, 1999 indicate that both Mr.
Argyle and Mr. Black prepared for and attended the hearing. R. 628; 630. It was
unnecessary and unreasonable for both lawyers to prepare for and attend this hearing,
particularly because only Mr. Black argued the motions. R. 590.
q.

Bell's attorneys claim they billed 2 hours on August 18, 1999 in two

separate but identical entries of 1 hour each for participating in a conference call with
the Court. R. 635. It was not necessary and unreasonable for both lawyers to
participate.
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r.

Bell's attorneys claim they billed 2 hours on August 26, 1999 in two

separate but identical entries of 1 hour each for reviewing correspondence from
Eagar's counsel and preparing a response. R. 623. Once again, it was not necessary
and unreasonable for both lawyers to review and respond to a letter from Eagar's
counsel.
s.

Bell's attorneys claim they billed 4 hours on October 21, 1999 (2

separate entries of 2 hours each) to review a memorandum from Eagar's counsel in
response to the Utah Court of Appeals Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition
(R. 585). R. 638. That memorandum was only 1 lA pages long. See Exhibit A.
Thereafter, Bell's attorneys billed 5 hours total on October 25, 1999 (2 separate
entries of 1 hour each), October 28,1999 and November 4,1999 to draft and review
their own memorandum. R. 638. Bell's memorandum was two sentences long; his
attorneys simply concurred with Eagar's memorandum. See Exhibit B.
t.

Bell's attorneys claim they billed 62 hours to review Eagar's brief in the

prior appeal and research/draft their own brief on April 17, 2000, April 18, 2000,
April 19,2000 (including 2 identical entries of 2 hours each), April 28,2000, May 1,
2000, May 3,2000, May 8,2000, May 10, 2000, May 11,2000, May 18,2000, May
19,2000, May 22,2000, May 23,2000, May 24,2000, May 25,2000, May 26,2000
and May 30,2000 (including an entry for 3 hours to print and file their brief). R. 64042. Eagar's brief was 16 pages, 8 of which was argument. See Exhibit C. The
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arguments advanced and cases discussed in Eagar's brief were the same arguments
and cases discussed in the memoranda in opposition to Bell's motion for summary
judgment and in support of Eagar's cross-motion for summary judgment. See id.; R.
97-114; 194-211; 303-37; 504-15. Bell's brief was only 14pages, including lOpages
of argument, the vast majority of which was briefed and argued to the trial court. See
Exhibit D; R. 56-62; 399-407.
This sampling of "compilation" entries proved that the attorneys' fees sought by Bell
were, at a minimum, unreasonable. Faced with overwhelming evidence confirming this, the
trial court had only two options: (1) deny Bell's motion entirely; or (2) drastically reduce
Bell's unsubstantiated request. The trial court had the discretion to choose. See Dejavue.
1999 UT 355, ^ 8, 993 P.2d at 222; Faust. 2000 UT 82,1f 12, 15 P.3d at 1268. It did not
abuse its discretion by choosing the second.
REQUEST FOR FEES ON APPEAL
A contractual obligation to pay attorneys' fees includes those fees incurred by the
party that prevails on appeal. See Management Servs. Corp. v. Development Assocs., 617
P.2d 406, 408-09 (Utah 1980); Sprouse v. Jager. 806 P.2d 219, 227 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
When this Court affirms the trial court, it should also require Bell to pay the reasonable
attorneys' fees incurred by Eagar in connection with this appeal, the amount of which will
be determined after this appeal is concluded.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court's ruling was proper and should be affirmed.
DATED this _/Jj day of January, 2002.
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR

Paul M. Durham
Steve K. Gordon
Attorneys for Defendant, Counterclaimant
and Appellant James LeRoy Eagar
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

l£& of January, 2002,1 caused two true and correct

copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Wesley C. Argyle
BLACK, STITH & ARGYLE
365 North 200 West
Bountiful, Utah 84010
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On October 13,1999, this Court issued a Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition in
this matter. In that motion, the Court expressed concern over whether the order from which
defendant appealed (the "Order") is a final order. This short memorandum addresses that issue.
On May 12,1999, the trial court entered the Order. See Exhibit A. In the Order, the trial
court granted plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on their claim and denied defendant's
motion for partial summary judgment on his counterclaim. The trial court made no other ruling on
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Accordingly, defendant filed a Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification with the trial court. See
Exhibit B. Plaintiffs stipulated to that motion. See Exhibit C. Based on that stipulation, on July 21,
1999, the trial court granted defendant's Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification and certified the Order
as a final appealable order. See Exhibit D. As a result, the concern apparently underlying this
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Based on the foregoing, defendant respectfully requests that this appeal not be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.
Dated this 19th day of October, 1999.
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR
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JURISDICTION
This is an appeal by James LeRoy Eagar ("Eagar") from the May 12, 1999 final

judgment of the Honorable Rodney F. Page of the Second Judicial District Court of Davis
County, State of Utah in favor of appellees (collectively "Bell"). Pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1996), this appeal was assigned to this Court which has jurisdiction under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).
IL

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court incorrectly rule that the parties' warehouse lease was

unambiguous and excluding pivotal extrinsic evidence? Whether a contract is ambiguous
is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See Interwest Const, v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350,
1358-59 (Utah 1996). Only where a contract is unambiguous can the trial court interpret it
as a matter of law. That interpretation is also reviewed for correctness. See kL This issue
was raised in the trial court at R. 97-188; 194-299; 303-318; 319-337.
2.

Did disputed issues of material fact summary judgment for Bell? Because

summary judgment involves only legal issues, this Court affords no deference to the trial
court's factual conclusions. See Coulter & Smith. Ltd. v. Russell. 966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah
1998). This issue was raised in the trial court at R. 97-188; 194-299; 319-337.
3.

Did the trial court err in denying Eagar's motion for partial summary

judgment? Because summary judgment involves only legal issues, this Court affords no
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deference to the trial court's factual conclusions. Id. This issue was raised in the trial court
atR. 303-318; 504-515.
III.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
Utah R. Civ. P. 56 and Utah Code, Jud. Admin. R. 4-501 are determinative. See

Addendum.

IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This action involves Eagar's sale of J. L. Eagar, Inc. (the "Business"), which sells and
distributes products and equipment in the aqua-cultural industry worldwide. The aquaculture industry involves the production, rearing, planting, replenishing and/or conservation
of various fresh and salt water fish species, seafood and shell fish.
Eagar founded and built the Business from the ground up, devoting nearly 20 years
of hard work, sacrifice, attention to detail and steadfast marketing efforts to create a national,
and later international, reputation. Eventually, Eagar decided to sell the Business and retire.
L. Stanley Bell purchased it The Business was thriving when it was sold to Bell. As a result
of pending bids and contracts, the Business yielded more profit in BelFs first year of
ownership than in any prior year.
Bell also wanted to lease from Eagar the Property on which the Business was operated
and, after the purchase, Bell operated the Business on the Property. A disagreement
developed over the terms of the lease and, fundamentally, whether a binding lease existed.
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Bell sued, alleging that the parties specified and agreed to all material terms of a lease, and
requested declaratory relief. Eagar counterclaimed, alleging that although the parties had
attempted to negotiate a lease, they never agreed upon a mutually-acceptable lease. Eagar
also requested declaratory relief
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW

The trial court granted Bell's motion for partial summary judgment and denied
Eagar's motion for partial summary judgment on May 12,1999, R, 539-541; 590 at 28-30.
C,

STATEMENT OF FACTS,
1.

Eagar's Decision to Sell the Business.

Eagar operated and owned the "Business" until January of 1997, R, 116 at ^ 4.
Eagar contacted Business Resource Center ("BRC"), a business brokerage company, in
September, 1996, expressing an interest in selling the Business. See kL at ^ 5; R. 220 at ^
4. Eagar and BRC's Ted Brasssard ("Brassard") discussed the terms of a possible sale. See
R. 117 at ^ 6; R. 220 at ^[ 5. Whether Eagar would lease the Property was also discussed.
See R. 117 at ^ 7; R. 220 at \ 6. However, at the time, Eagar preferred not to lease the
Property, anticipating instead its prompt sale. See R. 117 at ^ 8; R. 220 at ^J7. In subsequent
conversations with Brassard, Eagar reluctantly agreed to "consider" leasing the Property to
the buyer of the Business, but only if the terms "were fair". See R. 117 at \ 9; R. 220 at \ 8.
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2.

Sale and Lease Negotiations.

BRCs Larry Hatch ("Hatch") helped Bell prepare a written offer (the "Offer") to
purchase the Business on December 11,1996. See R. 117 at ^f 10; R. 220 at ^ 9. Paragraph
8 of the Offer requested a ten-year property lease with monthly payments of $2,281.00. See
R. 117 at % 11; R. 220 at ^ 10. Bell's proposed payment — which was the same amount Eagar
had charged himself — fell well below market value. Eagar informed Hatch and Brassard
that he rejected the Offer because he would not commit to such a discounted lease payment
for ten years. See R. 117 at ^ 12; R. 220 at K 1L
Bell through Hatch, asked Eagar to consider the $2,281.00 lease payment for the first
two years to help Bell maintain the success of the Business after the purchase. Eagar told
Hatch that he would agree to the low lease payment, but only for two years. Eagar stressed
that after two years, the lease payment had to increase to fair market value, using words to
that effect. Hatch said that they could raise rent to fair market value after the second year by
incorporating the Consumer Price Index ("CPI") in the lease. Eagar told Hatch that if
referring to the CPI in the lease would ensure that lease payments would increase and remain
at fair market value after two years, he would agree. See R. 117 at % 13; R. 220-21 at ^J12.
Later, Brassard and Eagar discussed the Eagar/Hatch conversation. Eagar essentially
restated what he told Hatch; he would agree to the low lease payment for two years, then the
amount had to increase by referring to the CPI to a "fair level", or fair- market value, where
it must remain for the remaining lease term. See R. 221 at ^[ 13.
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Based on this information, Brassard prepared a written counteroffer (the
"Counteroffer") which included the following term: "Lease 5 year. Triple Net. Fix Rate
First 24 Month. $2,281 + 3 Net Balance 3 years. Tie to CPI plus one 5 year option." See R.
221 at U 13; 223. Bell accepted. See R. 221 at ^ 16.
3.

Documenting the Sale and Efforts to Document a Lease.

BRC prepared a "Contingency Removal" which contained the following provision:
Seller hereby guarantees to deliver to purchaser a valid lease which has a base
rent of $2,281 per month for the first 24 months. Plus three years additional
with an adjusted base tied to the C.P.I, plus one five year option to renew;
also tied to the Consumer Price Index. The Lease shall be Triple-Net. The
Lease will be drawn up outside the Closing.
See R. 71 at (emphasis added). Though Eagar had not asked BRC to prepare the
Contingency Removal, BRC presented it to Eagar who, believing that document was
customary in this type of transaction, signed it on January 8,1997. Bell also signed. See R.
119 at ^ 18. Bell and Eagar closed on the sale of the Business the following week through
a "Purchase Agreement" prepared by BRC. See R. 119 at \ 19; R. 64-65.
After the closing, Bell took possession of the Property and began operating the
Business. See R. 119 at ^ 20. Eagar gave Bell a proposed written lease agreement in
approximately July of 1997, which Bell rejected, alleging that the terms varied from the
Counteroffer and Contingency Removal. See id. at % 21. In October 1997, Eagar offered
Bell another proposed written lease agreement with lease payment terms to which Eagar had
agreed before closing: (1) a five-year lease term with an option to renew for five additional
Page -5-

years; (2) discounted rent of $2,281.00 per month for the first two years, then adjusted to
market rate thereafter with annual adjustments for subsequent years based upon the CPI; and
(3) the lease was "triple net/' with Bell paying property taxes, utilities, maintenance and
insurance. See id. at ^ 22. Bell rejected the second lease, contending that after the first two
discounted years, the lease payment should not rise to the market rate, but only by annual
increases based on the CPL See id. at ^f 23. Under Bell's proposal, lease payments would
remain significantly below fair-market value throughout the life of the lease and would cause
Eagar to lose over $85,000 in last eight years of the lease. Eagar rejected that notion. See
id. at K 24.
Bell and Eagar never agreed on how the CPI operated to increase the lease payments.
The parties never discussed it directly or through Hatch or Brassard. Bell said only that he
construed the CPI language based on assumptions he formed through his business
experience. See R. 231 (p. 24); R. 232 (p. 25); R. 238-39 (pp. 52-54). The parties also never
agreed on which year's CPI to use. They never discussed this either directly or through
others. Again, Bell simply assumed that the 1998 CPI would be used. See id. R. 238-39
(pp. 52-55).
Bell did not allege that the parties agreed to any lease terms beyond duration and
lease payments. Rather, Bell testified that he rejected all Eagar's lease drafts that Eagar that
included any terms other than lease duration and payment. Bell testified that the "lease" he
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sought to enforce on summary judgment "does not include all of the terms of the lease." See
R. 233 (p. 32); R 236 (p. 44); R 238 (p. 49); R 240-41 (pp. 59-61); R 252-299.
Despite receiving multiple proposed lease drafts, Bell never advised Eagar that in his
view a valid binding lease already existed. Instead, Bell sent Eagar proposed modifications
to those drafts. See R. 236 (p. 42); 237-38 (pp. 46-49); R. 239 (pp. 55-56); R 240-41 (pp.
59-62). In the end, Bell testified that "[t]he parties have never agreed to any lease." R. 237
(p. 48, line 17).
The trial court found that the Counteroffer and Contingency Removal were
unambiguous and that Eagar's extrinsic evidence was precluded, granted BelFs motion for
partial summary judgment and denied Eagar's motion. R. 539-541; 590 at 28-30.
V,

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A.

If a contract term is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is

ambiguous and the court must consider extrinsic evidence to discern its meaning. Here, the
trial court ruled that the Counteroffer and Contingency Removal unambiguously provide that
lease payments would be adjusted after twenty four months only as dictated by the CPI, with
no increase to market value in the third year. The court refused to consider the mass of
extrinsic evidence establisheding that the monthly lease payment was to be increased from
$2,281 per month to fair-market value after twenty-four months, and then adjusted annually
by referring to the CPI.
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Both parties' interpretations of the payment provision are plausible. Thus, the trial
court should have considered extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent. The trial
court's refusal to do so, and its grant of summary judgment for Bell, were erroneous and
should be reversed.
B.

Disputed issues of material fact precluded summary judgment for Bell. Bell

argued that he and Eagar created a valid lease. However, he testified that the parties never
agreed to any lease. Additional evidence established that the parties did not reach agreement
as to all, or even a significant number of, the essential terms of the alleged lease, including
the lease payment. The trial court erred by granting Bell's motion in the face of that
contradictory evidence.
C.

Eagar was entitled to declaratory judgment that, as a matter of law, no

enforceable lease existed. Eagar sought an order declaring that no lease existed because the
parties had not agreed to all essential terms. Bell failed to profer admissible evidence that he
and Eagar agreed to all essential terms. Because of this fatal omission, the trial court's denial
of Eagar's motion was erroneous.
VL

ARGUMENT
A-

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FINDING THE ALLEGED LEASE
PAYMENT TERM UNAMBIGUOUS, AND BY PRECLUDING
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF ITS MEANING.

The trial court rule — on summary judgment — that the Counteroffer and Contingency
Removal were unambiguous. R. 539-541; 590 at 28-30. It incorrectly read them to provide
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for the lease payments Bell suggested, rejecting evidence establishing that the payment was
to rise to fair-market value after twenty-four months, and then adjust annually by referring
to the CPL See id. These rulings are erroneous as a matter of law and should be reversed.
"Under the basic principles of contract law, a contract is not formed unless there is a
meeting of the minds." See Sackler v. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah 1995); see also
Richard Barton Enterprises. Inc. v. Tsern. 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996) ("[i]t is
fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral features of an agreement is essential
to the formation of a contract"). Such mutual assent "requires assent by all parties to the
same thing in the same sense so that their minds meet as to all the terms." See Crimson v.
Western Co. of North Am.. 742 P.2d 1219,1221 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

To determine

whether a meeting of minds occurred, the court must first discern the meaning of the disputed
provision. If the provision is ambiguous or uncertain, the court should consider extrinsic
evidence. See Interwest Constr. v. Palmer. 923 P.2d 1350, 1359 (Utah 1996); Ward v.
Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264,268 (Utah 1995). A contract is ambiguous if
it is unclear, omits terms, or if terms used to express the intention of the parties may be
understood to have two or more plausible meanings. See Seare v. University of Utah School
of Medicine. 882 P.2d 673, 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). To test ambiguity, "any relevant
evidence must be considered. Otherwise, the determination of ambiguity is inherently onesided, namely, it is based solely on the extrinsic evidence of the judge's own linguistic
education and experience." Ward, 907 P.2d at 268 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
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After considering all relevant evidence, if the court finds ambiguity, extrinsic evidence is
admissible " to explain the intent of the parties." See Willard Pease Oil and Gas Co. v.
Pioneer Oil and Gas Co.. 899 P.2d 766, 700 (Utah 1995).
Here, the alleged lease was ambiguous and demanded extrinsic evidence to give it
meaning. The parties agreed that monthly lease payments would be $2,281 for twenty-four
months, with an "adjusted base" thereafter tied to the CPL See R. 7 L However, the parties
disagreed on the meaning of "adjusted base." Bell says the provision means that monthly
lease payments will increase in the third and subsequent years only by the percentage
reflected by the CPL Eagar intended for payments to rise in the third year to fair-market
value, and in subsequent years according to the CPL
On its face, the contract alone offers insufficient guidance for the trial court to
determine the correct interpretation. Both interpretations are plausible. Thus, as a matter of
law, the payment provision is ambiguous. See Seare, 882 P.2d at 677 (holding that contract
is ambiguous if it is unclear, omits terms, or if terms used to express the intention of the
parties may be understood to have two or more plausible meanings). As an ambiguous term,
the trial court should have considered the illuminating extrinsic evidence to determine the
parties' intent. See Willard Pease Oil and Gas Co.. 899 P.2d at 700. The trial court erred by
refusing to do so.
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B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING BELL'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
1.

EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING THAT THE PARTIES NEVER
AGREED TO A LEASE CREATED GENUINE ISSUES OF
MATERIAL FACT THAT PRECLUDED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT-

The evidence raised genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment
for Bell. While Bell argued that he and Eagar created a valid lease, he testified earlier that
"[tjhe parties have never agreed to any lease." R. 237 (p. 48, line 17). Bell conceded that,
although Eagar had submitted several proposed leases, Bell he never advised Eagar that he
believed a valid, binding lease already existed. See R. 236 (p. 42); 237-38 (pp. 46-49); R.
239 (pp. 55-56); R. 240-41 (pp. 59-62). Bell also admitted that he offered written
modifications to Eagar's proposed lease. See R. 236 (p. 42); 237-38 (pp. 46-49); R. 239 (pp.
55-56); R. 240-41 (pp. 59-62).
Such evidence ~ from Bell himself— established genuine issues of fact (or established
outright) that Bell believed that the parties had not reached any agreement (no meeting of
minds), but were negotiating a mutually-acceptable lease. This evidence, and all reasonable
inferences derived therefrom, viewed in Eagar's favor, precluded summary judgment for Bell
as a matter of law. See Crimson, 742 P.2d at 1222 ("the subsequent leases exchanged by the
parties demonstrates that there was no meeting of the minds"); Willard Pease Oil and Gas
Co., 899 P.2d at 766 (noting that all the evidence and inferences therefrom must be viewed
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in the light most favorable to the non-moving party). The trial court erred by ruling on
summary judgment that the parties had agreed to a lease.
2,

EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT THE PARTIES NEVER
AGREED TO ALL MATERIAL TERMS OF A LEASE,

Under Utah law, Bell had to prove through undisputed evidence, that he and Eagar
agreed to all essential lease terms. See Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc., 928 P.2d at 373 ("It
is fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral features of an agreement is
essential to the formation of a contract"); see also Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. v. Quintek, 834
P.2d 582, 584 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("in order to create an enforceable contract, the parties
must mutually agree to all essential terms of the supposed agreement") (internal quotation
and citation omitted); Piston v. EnviroPak Medical Prod., Inc., 893 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995) ("[A] contract can be enforced by the courts only if the obligations of the
parties are set forth with sufficient definiteness that it can be performed") (alteration in
original) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

The Court must examine the

circumstances surrounding an alleged agreement to identify the essential terms. See
Crimson, 742 P.2d at 1221-22. The trial court failed to do so in this case.
The alleged contract in this case was a lease of commercial office and warehouse
space. The essential terms of such a lease would include much more than duration and
monthly payments. Other material issues may include: (1) the payment of utilities and other
operating expenses; (2) permitted uses of the property; (3) maintenance, repair and alteration
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of the premises; (4) landlord's access to the premises; (5) the parties' rights upon damage or
destruction of the premises; (6) expiration or termination of the lease; (7) indemnification;
(8) security deposits; (9) insurance on the premises; (10) events of default and remedies; and
(11) whether the lease can be assigned. Yet, Bell did not even allege agreement on any of
these terms. Bell testified that he rejected Eagar's proposed leases that included provisions
governing those critical issues. Ultimately, Bell conceded that the alleged lease "does not
include all of the terms of the lease." See R. 233 (p. 32); R. 236 (p. 44); R. 238 (p. 49); R.
240-41 (pp. 59-61); R. 252-299.
In sum, as Bell's testimony confirms, the parties did not agree on all, or even a
significant number of, the essential terms of the alleged lease. The evidence discussed above
— viewed in light most favorable to Eagar — created a genuine issue of material fact that
precluded summary judgment for Bell. The trial court erred by granting Bell's motion.
3.

EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT THE PARTIES NEVER
AGREED TO THE ALLEGED LEASE PAYMENT.

Even if undisputed evidence established all essential lease terms except for lease
payment (and it did not), Bell still would had to show that he Eagar agreed to the same lease
payment. See Sadder. 897 P.2d atl220; Richard Barton Enterprises. Inc.. 928 P.2d at 373;
Crimson. 742 P.2d at 1221. Bell failed to carry this burden.
Evidence established that monthly lease payments for twenty-four months would be
$2,281 with an "adjusted base" thereafter tied to the CPI. R. 71. However, evidence also
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showed that Eagar believed "adjusted base" meant that the payment would be adjusted in the
third year to fair-market value, and in subsequent years as dictated by the CPL See R. 117
at U 13; R. 220-21 at ^ U 12 & 13. On the other hand, Bell says he believed it meant that the
payment would be adjusted only as dictated by the CPI, with no increase to market value in
the third year. R. 56-61. Because both interpretations are facially plausible, the trial court
was constrained to consider extrinsic evidence on intent, including evidence presented by
Eagar, to determine the correct interpretation. See Interwest Constr., 923 P.2d at 1359;
Ward, 907 P.2d at 268; Seare, 882 P.2d at 677; Willard Pease Oil and Gas Co.. 899 P.2d at
700.
The evidence discussed above established that Eagar and Bell never agreed to the
monthly lease payments Bell urges, or even which year's CPI would be used. See R. 117 at
ffil 12 & 13; R. 119 at K 24; R. 220-21 at ffi 11, 12 &13; R. 238-39 (pp. 52-55). The trial
court had to accept Eagar's evidence as true on summary judgment, drawing all reasonable
inferences in Eagar's favor. See C. Sanchez and Son, Inc. v. United States, 6 F.3d 1539,
1541 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Richardson v. Oldham, 12 F.3d 1373,1379 (5th Cir. 1994).1 Where
that evidence and the associated inferences reveal genuine issues of fact, summary judgment
l

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is substantially similar to Rule 56 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56 (Compiler's Notes). Thus, this Court
can freely refer to authorities which have interpreted the federal counterpart. See Gold
Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Resources Corp., 805 P.2d 164 (Utah 1990); Wilson v.
Lambert, 613 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980); Miller v. Brocksmith, 825 P.2d 690 (Utah Ct. App.
1992).
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is precluded. See Fitzgerald v. General Dairies, Inc.. 590 F.2d 874, 875 (10th Cir. 1979);
Cox, v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie. 17F.3d 1386, 1396(1 lth Cir. 1994). At most,
the evidence suggested a "concept" was developing for monthly lease payments in the third
year and subsequent years. However, no clear method for establishing the exact amount was
agreed upon. Such a conceptual framework is insufficient for summary judgment as a matter
of law. See Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc., 928 P.2d at 373. The trial court's summary
judgment should be reversed,
C.

EAGAR IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Bell's failure to establish all essential terms of the alleged lease also confirms Eagar's
entitlement to summary judgment that no enforceable lease existed. Eagar sought a
declaration that no lease existed because the parties had not agreed to all essential terms. To
defeat Eagar's motion, Bell had to profer admissible evidence that he and Eagar agreed to
all essential terms. See Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc., 928 P.2d at 373 ("It is fundamental
that a meeting of the minds on the integral features of an agreement is essential to the
formation of a contract"); Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc., 834 P.2d at 584 ("in order to create
an enforceable contract, the parties must mutually agree to all essential terms of the supposed
agreement") (internal quotation and citation omitted); Piston, 893 P.2d at 1075 ("[A]
contract can be enforced by the courts only if the obligations of the parties are set forth with
sufficient definiteness that it can be performed"). Bell failed to do so, responding only with
conclusory allegations. See R. 399-402; 504-05. As a matter of law, the undisputed facts
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established by Eagar's extrinsic evidence should have been deemed admitted for purposes
of Eagar's motion. See Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-501(2)(b); Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); Don
Houston, M.D., Inc. v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.. 933 P.2d 403, 407 n.6 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997); Webster v. Sill 675 P.2d 1170,1172 (Utah 1983). Those facts established that
Bell and Eagar did not agree on the essential elements of the alleged lease. Thus, Eagar was
entitled to declaratory judgment that, as a matter of law, no enforceable lease existed. The
trial court's denial of Eagar's motion was therefore erroneous and should be reversed,
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Eagar respectfully requests that this Court: (1) reverse the
trial court's grant of Bell's motion for partial summary judgment; (2) reverse the trial court's
denial of Eagar's motion for summary judgment; and (3) remand the matter for further
proceedings consistent with this Court's rulings.
DATED this 27th day of April, 2000.
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR

raul M. Durham
Steve K. Gordon
Attorneys for Defendant, Counterclaimant
and Appellant James LeRoy Eagar
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ADDENDUM

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 56 - SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20
days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary
judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary
judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or
without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part
thereof.
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall
be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions onfile,together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is
a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is
not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court
at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted.
It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in
controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial
of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be
conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would
be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify
to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred
to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or
further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
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specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond,
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When Affidavits Are Unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to
justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be
had or may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at
any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith
or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them
to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the
affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorneys fees, and any offending party
or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
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UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, RULE 4-501 - MOTIONS
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda and
documents with the court.
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on
dispositive motions.
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district courts except proceedings before
the court commissioners and small claims cases. This rule does not apply to petitions for
habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinaiy relief.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Filing and Service of Motions and Memoranda.
(a) Motion and Supporting Memoranda. All motions, except uncontested or ex-parte
matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities, appropriate
affidavits, and copies of or citations by page number to relevant portions of depositions,
exhibits or other documents relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting
or opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the "statement of
material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the court on
ex-parte application. If an ex-parte application is made to file an over-length memorandum,
the application shall state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum
is in excess often pages, the application shall include a summary of the memorandum, not
to exceed five pages.
(b) Memorandum in Opposition to Motion. The responding party shall file and serve
upon all parties within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in opposition to the
motion, and all supporting documentation. If the responding party fails to file a
memorandum in opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the
moving party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision as provided
in paragraph (l)(d) of this rule.
(c) Reply Memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply memorandum
within five days after service of the responding party's memorandum.
(d) Notice to Submitfor Decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day period to file
a reply memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk to submit the matter to the court for
decision. The notification shall be in the form of a separate written pleading and captioned
"Notice to Submit for Decision." The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all
parties. If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision.
(2) Motions for Summary Judgment
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(a) Memorandum in Support of a Motion. The points and authorities in support of
a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement
of material facts as to which movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be
stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the
record upon which the movant relies.
(b) Memorandum in Opposition to a Motion. The points and authorities in opposition
to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise
statement of material facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each
disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to
those portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall
state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. All material
facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to
the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically
controverted by the opposing party's statement.
(3) Hearings.
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless ordered by the
Court, or requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(b) or (4) below.
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action or any issues
in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at the time of filing the principal
memorandum in support of or in opposition to a motion may file a written request for a
hearing.
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the motion or
opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of issues
governing the granting or denial of the motion has been authoritatively decided.
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the requesting party.
When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall set the matter for hearing or notify the
requesting party that the matter shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the
matter for hearing and notify all parties of the date and time.
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the motion,
memorandum of points and authorities and all documents supporting or opposing the motion
shall be delivered to the judge hearing the matter at least two working days before the date
set for hearing. Copies shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and
time of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the court.
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties file their principal
memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed waived.
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (3 0) days before the scheduled
trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after that date without leave of the Court.
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(4) Expedited Dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause shown, the
court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case where time is of the
essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule would be impracticable or where the
motion does not raise significant legal issues and could be resolved summarily.
(5) Telephone Conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's request may
direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without court appearance. A
verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments and the rulings thereon if requested
by counsel.
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JURISDICTION
This is an appeal by James LeRoy Eagar ( "Eagar") from the May 12, 1999 final
judgment of the Honorable Rodney F. Page of the Second Judicial District Court of Davis
County, State of Utah in favor of appellees (collectively "Bell"). Pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated Section 78-2-2(4) (1996), this appeal was assigned to this court which has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly rule that the parties' agreement with respect to the

lease was unambiguous? If the agreement is unambiguous the court may exclude extrinsic
evidence. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 306 P.2d 773 (Utah 1957). This issue
was raised at trial court. R. 61, 341-342, 590 at 28.
2.

If there were ambiguities in the contract, was the appellant the draftsman of

the contract? Ambiguities in contracts are to be construed against the draftsman. Sears v.
Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982). This issue was raised at trial court. R. 341-342.
3.

Did the trial court err in denying the motion for summary judgment of

appellant? If there were no disputed material issues of fact in favor of appellant, or if there
were disputed material issues of fact, then such motion should have been denied. This issue
was raised in the trial court. R. 403-406.
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
Utah R. Civ. P. 56 and Utah Code Jud. Admin R. 4-501 are determinative. See
Addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This action involves the purchase by appellee of appellant's business. Appellant was
in the aquaculture business, selling equipment and supplies to fish hatcheries.
Appellant had founded this business and worked in if for a number of years, but had
decided to sell his business. This led to the offer to purchase the business by appellee.
Appellee offered to purchase the business at a specified price which included obtaining lease
of premises used by the business, which were also owned by appellant, for $2,281.00 per
month (the amount paid by the corporation at the time of the sale) for a term often years.
The parties ultimately agreed on the sales price and terms for the business, including a five
year lease of premises at the rate of $2,281.00 per month, subject to annual adjustments
based upon the consumer price index after the second year and a five year option to extend
the lease upon the same terms, subject to adjustment to reflect changes in the consumer price
index.. Appellant failed to produce the lease as required by the agreement and appellee filed
suit to enforce the provisions of said lease.
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B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW

The trial court granted appellee's motion for partial summary judgment and denied
appellant's motion for summary judgment on May 12, 1999. R. 539-541; R. 590 at 28-30.

C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellee purchased the business in January of 1997. He learned of the business
through a broker with the Business Resource Center, a business brokerage company, in the
fall of 1996. Since he was interested in purchasing the business, he made an offer to
purchase the business. The terms of the offer included the terms, purchase price and payment
for the assets of the business, and a requirement that the building, which was also owned by
appellant, be leased to appellee upon the same terms and conditions as it had been leased to
the company at the time of the sale for a period often (10) years from the date of sale. R.
64.
In response to his offer, appellee received a counter offer modifying the terms of
purchase, and specifying that a five year lease at current rate subject to adjustment pursuant
to the consumer price index annually after the second year, together with an option to extend
the lease upon the same terms for an additional five year term. Appellee accepted appellant's
counteroffer. R. 67-68.
Appellee and appellant subsequently executed a Release of Contingencies, again
stating the terms of the lease as outlined herein, and entered into a purchase agreement for
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the business. R. 71 Appellees agreed that appellant would subsequently present a lease
embodying these tenns agreed upon to appellees

Although several draft leases were

presented none of them embodied the terms agreed upon in the Counteroffer. R. 73-76, 252299.
The trial court found that the Counteroffer and Contingency Removal were
unambiguous and that appellees were entitled to declaratory judgment establishing the
existence of the lease and requiring that appellant provide a written lease to appellees. R.
590 at 27. The trial court further denied appellant's motion for summary judgment. R. 590
at 27-30.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The parties agreed to the terms of a triple net lease for a term of five years at the
specified rate of $2,281.00 per month, subject to adjustment reflecting changes in the
consumer price index after the second year and subsequently. They agreed that these were
the material terms of this lease, and that the lease was to be drafted by appellant and
delivered to appellees. This agreement was set forth with clarity in the Counteroffer and the
Contingency Removal
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ARGUMENT

A.

THE APPELLANT HAS ADMITTED ALL RELEVANT FACTS
AS ALLEGED BY APPELLEES, LEA VING ONLY THE LEGAL
ISSUE AS TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACT
WHICH ENTITLES APPELLEES TO DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT

Appellant has admitted the execution of each and every document relevant to this
matter. Both the Counteroffer and the Contingency Removal are clear and unambiguous
documents, outlining the terms of the lease.
The terms of the lease were set forth with clarity in both the Counteroffer (R. 67-68)
prepared by appellant and in the Contingency Removal (R. 71). These terms were:
1.

The lease was to be for five (5) years.

2.

The lease was to be triple net.

3.

The lease rate was to be $2,281.00 for the first two years, plus the
expenses involved in the triple net.

4.

The balance of the five year term was to be at a base rent adjusted
pursuant to changes in the consumer price index.

5.

There was to be one five-year option upon the terms existing at the time
of the exercise of the option, adjusted to reflect changes in the
consumer price index.

The Contingency Removal guaranteed that the lease would be valid and would be
produced by appellant. Despite the passage of nearly two years, appellant failed to produce
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the lease in question, and further continued to refuse to produce the lease required until
ordered to do so by the District Court.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, together with their interpretative case law are
abundantly clear: when there are no material issues of fact to be determined, the Court may
interpret the law. Under the facts presented, the Court entered a summary judgement
declaring the existence of a lease between appellees and appellant upon the terms set forth
herein.
The facts of this case are eminently clear and easily understood by the District Court,
appellant's attempt to obfuscate and confuse the issues not withstanding. Appellee Bell
made an offer to purchase the corporation from the appellant. A term of the purchase was
that a lease be given on the building at the agreed upon rate for the agreed upon term. The
parties agreed that all of the other terms were mere technicalities and would be provided by
appellant in a document to be drafted after closing. Two years passed and numerous drafts
have been presented, but none of them have embodied those simple terms agreed upon by
the parties until after the order of the District Court.
The appellant initially offered a lease providing terms very similar to those agreed
upon, but for a much shorter term. R. 73-76. Since that initial document, the terms have
drawn further and further away from the agreement. The appellees ask for only what was
agreed upon by the parties.
The language which the parties agreed upon is clear and unambiguous:
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Lease 5 year Triple Net
Fix Rate first 24 month $2,281.00 + 3 Net.
Balance 3 years tie to CPI
Plus 1 5 year option (R. 67)
The Utah Supreme Court has held that where the terms of a contract are clear and
unambiguous, its construction by the Court can be done as a matter of law, which makes this
matter clearly a fit subject of a motion for summary judgment:
The interpretation of a contract is a matter of law for the court to determine
unless the contract is ambiguous and evidence of the parties' intent (which is
a matter of fact) is necessary to establish the terms of the contract. Saunders
v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991).
The court more fully examined this issue in Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 306
P.2d 773 (Utah 1957), in which it stated:
[I]ntent should be ascertained first from the four comers of the instrument
itself, second from other contemporaneous writings, and third from extrinsic
parol evidence of the intentions. If ambiguity can be reconciled from a
reasonable interpretation of the instrument, extrinsic evidence should not be
allowed. If the instrument on its face remains ambiguous in spite of the
reasonable construction, the intent may be ascertained in the light of all written
instruments which were a part of the same transaction. If the intent is
ambiguous still, then parol evidence may be admitted, and rules of
construction may be invoked to declare the intention of the parties. (Citations
omitted).
Appellant has argued that the language in question is ambiguous, and that the
document lends itself to two equally possible interpretations, first, the one offered by
appellees, and second the one that allows for the adjustment of the rent to the "fair market
value." Appellant's argument requires that the Court read a good deal into the contract to
reach its conclusion. Nowhere in any of the various documents, agreements and memoranda
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executed by the parties do the words "fair market value" appear. The only place this issue
was ever discussed was between appellant and his broker. R. 214, 220-221. Assuming, for
the purposes of this argument that the statements by appellant and his broker as offered in
the Affidavits are true, and that appellant and his broker actually discussed these issues, there
is no factual allegation that the information was actually communicated to appellee Bell.
Indeed, appellant is trapped by his own arguments under Utah law. The Utah
Supreme Court has ruled on this issue with great clarity. Where a party is responsible for
the drafting of a document and there is more than one possible interpretation of the
document, the document is to be construed against the party who drafted the document.
"The well-established rule in Utah is that any uncertainty with respect to construction of a
contract should be resolved against the party who had drawn the agreement," Sears v.
Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982).
The uncontroverted facts are clear. Appellant and his agent drafted the counteroffer.
The counteroffer was accepted by appellee Bell. The District Court found that the terms of
the counteroffer are clear and unambiguous. Under the best analysis offered by appellant,
and granting all of appellant's facts, the answer is the same: If there are, indeed, two equally
plausible interpretations of the written contract (which is not the case) the two interpretations
offered must be construed against the draftsman of the counteroffer, and appellee must
prevail.
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B.

APPELLEE BELL HAS NOTADMITTED THAT THE PARTIES
HA VE NEVER AGREED TO ANY LEASE,

Appellee Bell has not admitted that the parties have never agreed to any lease. The
language quoted from his deposition is quoted out of context and the meaning placed upon
by the appellant was not that clearly indicated in the deposition. The question was posed
after a long a meticulous review of draft after draft of proposed leases which did not embody
the basic terms agreed upon by the parties. To complete the quote: "Hence our being here."
It was appellee BelPs intent to say that the appellant had never tendered a lease embodying
the terms in question to him, thus the matter required resort to the Court. See: Second
Affidavit of L. Stanley Bell. R. 397-398. To the contrary, Appellee Bell's statement was
an affirmation of his position that although the parties had completed their agreement, that
the formal agreement had not been produced by Appellant as required by the agreement.

C.

APPELLEE BELL HAS NOTADMITTED THAT THE PARTIES
HAVE NEVER AGREED TO ALL OF THE MATERIAL TERMS
OF A COMMERCIAL LEASE.

Appellee Bell has admitted that there are more terms to a lease than those set forth in
the agreement of the parties. This is obvious. Appellee Bell asserts that the only terms that
were material to him in the lease were those set forth in the counteroffer, and that in fact, if
the terms of the counteroffer were included in the agreement, he would have accepted every
lease proposed by appellant. See: Second Affidavit of L. Stanley Bell. R. 397-398.
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D.

THERE WAS A MEETING OF THE MINDS BETWEEN THE
PARTIES REGARDING LEASE PAYMENT

The facts of this case are eminently clear and easily understood, appellant's attempt
to obfuscate and confuse the issues not withstanding. The facts are that appellee Bell made
an offer to purchase the assets of the corporation from the appellant. A term of the purchase
was that a lease be given on the building at an agreed upon rate for an agreed upon term.
The parties agreed that all of the other terms were mere technicalities and would be provided
by appellant in a document to be drafted after closing. Two years passed and numerous
drafts have been presented, but none of them have embodied those simple terms agreed upon
by the parties until after the order of the District Court.
The appellant initially offered a lease providing terms very similar to those agreed
upon, but for a much shorter term. Since that initial document, the terms have drawn further
and further away from the agreement. The appellees ask for only what was agreed upon by
the parties.
The language which the parties agreed upon is clear and unambiguous:
Lease 5 year Triple Net
Fix Rate first 24 month $2,281.00 + 3 Net.
Balance 3 years tie to CPI
Plus 1 5 year option (R. 67).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that where the terms of a contract are clear and
unambiguous, its construction by the Court can be done as a matter of law, which allows the
Court to deny appellant's Motion out of hand without even reaching the supposed issues:
Page-10-

The interpretation of a contract is a matter of law for the court to determine
unless the contract is ambiguous and evidence of the parties' intent (which is
a matter of fact) is necessary to establish the terms of the contract. Saunders
v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991).
The court more fully examined this issue in Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 306
P.2d 773 (Utah 1957), in which it stated:
[I]ntent should be ascertained first from the four corners of the instrument
itself, second from other contemporaneous writings, and third from extrinsic
parol evidence of the intentions. If ambiguity can be reconciled from a
reasonable interpretation of the instrument, extrinsic evidence should not be
allowed. If the instrument on its face remains ambiguous in spite of the
reasonable construction, the intent may be ascertained in the light of all written
instruments which were a part of the same transaction. If the intent is
ambiguous still, then parol evidence may be admitted, and rules of
construction may be invoked to declare the intention of the parties. (Citations
omitted).
Appellant has argued that the language in question is ambiguous, and that the
document lends itself to two equally possible interpretations, first, the one offered by
appellees, and second the one that allows for the adjustment of the rent to the "fair market
value." Appellant's argument requires that the Court read a good deal into the contract to
reach its conclusion. Nowhere in any of the various documents, agreements and memoranda
executed by the parties do the words "fair market value" appear. The only place this issue
was ever discussed was between appellant and his broker. R. 214, 220-221. Assuming, for
the purposes of this argument that the statements by appellant and his broker as offered in
the Affidavits are true, and that appellant and his broker actually discussed these issues, there
is no factual allegation that the information was actually communicated to appellee Bell.
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Appellant once again cannot prevail under Utah law. The Utah Supreme Court has
ruled on this issue with great clarity. Where a party is responsible for the drafting of a
document and there is more than one possible interpretation of the document, the document
is to be construed against the party who drafted the document. "The well-established rule
in Utah is that any uncertainty with respect to construction of a contract should be resolved
against the party who had drawn the agreement," Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105 Utah
(1982).
The uncontroverted facts are clear. Appellant and his agent drafted the counteroffer.
The counteroffer was accepted by appellee Bell. Appellees believe that the terms of the
counteroffer are clear and unambiguous. The District Court agreed. Under the best analysis
offered by appellant, and granting all of appellant's facts, the answer is the same: If there are,
indeed, two equally plausible interpretations of the written contract (which appellants
strongly dispute, since the so called plausible explanation requires reading something into
the agreement that even appellant does not allege was discussed between the parties) the two
interpretations offered must be construed against the draftsman of the counteroffer, and
appellees must prevail.
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E.

THERE IS NO ISSUE OF FACT. APPELLEES ARE
ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND BY THE
DEFINITION OF THIS RELIEF APPELLANTS ARE NOT
ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT

By arguing for summary judgment on his own behalf, appellant concedes that there
are no factual issues. The facts are fully before the Court as set forth in the Counteroffer:
Lease 5 year Triple Net
Fix Rate first 24 month $2,281.00 + 3 Net.
Balance 3 years tie to CPI
Plus 1 5 year option (R. 67)
The holding of the District provides the best legal analysis against the appellant's flawed
argument for summary judgment:
The Court would find that in looking at the counter offer of the
contingency removal and then the closing that occurred on this
particular sale, it is clear to the Court that the terms of the
payment are unambiguous. It said specifically in the counter
offer made by Mr. Eagar and dated by him, under that term it
was a five year triple net lease, fixed rate for the first 24 months
at $2,281. The balance of the three years would be tied to the
CPI and then there was a on five year option. That's not
ambiguous in any way.
It becomes even less subject to ambiguity when you look at the
contingency removal which, again, was signed by Mr. Eagar,
and, again, provided that they would enter into a lease
agreement with a base rate of $2,281 per month for the first 24
months plus three years additional with an adjusted base tied to
the CPI plus one five year option to reinstate. Also- or to
renew. Also tied to the Consumer Price Index. This lease shall
be triple net and the lease would be drawn outside of closing.
The Court would find that these terms are unambiguous. Triple
net is a term of art, widely accepted within the industry and
business world; that the Consumer Price Index is also well
known and accepted and used in many facets of our business
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life and other governmental capacities to make computations
and adjustments based upon that Consumer Price Index.
Therefore, the Court will grant partial summary judgment and
find that the agreement entered into by the parties was that they
would enter into a lease agreement; that the terms of payment
would $2,281 per month for the first 24 months. The balance of
the three years would be adjusted pursuant to the Consumer
Price Index and there is no ambiguity as to what was meant by
adjusted based because the sentence before in the Contingency
Removal refers to the base rate at $2,281 per month. So, there
is no question. We're talking about the same thing. That the
lease would be triple net which under the common parlance and
understanding in the industry means property taxes, utilities,
maintenance and insurance. The Court would find that it
provides again for a renewable option for an additional five
years, again tied to the Consumer Price Index. So the court
grants summary partially on that particular issue. R. 590 at 2830.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, appellees respectfully request that this Court: (1) sustain
the decision of the trial court granting appellee's motion for partial summary judgment; and
(2) sustaining the decision of the trial court in denying appellant's motion for summary
judgment.
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Dated thisj^fy day of May, 2000.
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ADDENDUM
No addendum is necessary.
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